Question VII: Whether judgment is an act of justice

You have the various significations of IUDICII in Navarro supra Rubricam de Iudiciis, and in Valentiam disp. 5. quaest. 4. puncto primo.

The name of Judgment signifies MANY things. First it signifies the definition of that which is Just and equal among some, connoting at the same time a certain power of compelling the parties to the execution of the right defined. Such judgment is the sentence of a judge. Whence he is called Iudex whose it is to judge according to the laws, which in Greek is δίκαιος from δικάζω, as Valentia notes with D. Bonav. in 1. dist. 45. parte 1. dub. 1. litt. Therefore indico is ius dico.

SECONDLY by Metaphor it has been transferred to signify that which has been judged by a judge, as Ioan. 5. They who have done evil shall come forth into the resurrection of judgment. And prima Cor. 11. He eats and drinks judgment to himself. Therefore it chiefly expresses condemnation, as S. Doct. indicates in 4. dist. 18. p. 1. dubio secundo.

THIRDLY in the same way it also signifies, in a certain way, things pertaining to judgment, as the tribunal. Thus Judgment is divided into Secular and Ecclesiastical cap. Quanto, extra de Iudiciis.

FOURTHLY it signifies any definition of the intellect, in what manner it is said to pertain to Synesis, which is a part of potential Prudence, and it ought to be regulated to truth, as S. Doct. teaches dist. 25. citata, secundo sent. dub. 1. But this is twofold, Speculative and Practical, as D. Bonav. teaches in 2. dist. 23. quaest. 2. ad 2. et dist. 7. p. 2. quaest. 1. in corpore.

FIFTHLY it signifies that sentence of the intellect which is made concerning the probity of another, concerning which Matth. 7. Judge not, and you shall not be judged.

But this SENTENCE is from the will commanding, whose it is to judge. Therefore free choice also is defined as the judgment of reason, because in the free act, especially of judging concerning the probity of another, reason intervenes, and the judgment or decree of the will, as S. Doctor observes loc. cit. Secundi sent.

But S. Doct. OBSERVES in 1. dist. 3. p. 1. quaest. 1. ad 4. that to judge concerning something is twofold. The first, by discerning whether it is, or is not; and in this way judgment belongs to every intellect knowing with respect to every object. The second, by approving or reproving; and thus it does not judge concerning truth, but according to it concerning other things, as D. August. says de vera Religione, cap. 31. that a judge does not judge concerning the law, but according to it judges concerning other things, and in this way one judging exercises the judging power, and the Right over the judged. Therefore this judgment is reserved to God, but not conceded to us, as Matth. loc. cit. says and Paulus Galatas 6. Therefore do not judge before the time, until the Lord come.

In almost this manner he says three things of JUDGMENT. First the collation of merit or demerit to reward or punishment properly. Secondly he adds the discussion of merits and the pronouncing of sentence. Thirdly it is called, appropriately, condemnation itself, as S. Doct. notes in 4. dist. 47. art. 1. quaest. 3. in resol. Therefore we are prohibited from judging, that is, from condemning anyone, even privately, after the merits and demerits have been discussed, because this pertains to the judgment of God, as S. Doct. teaches ibi, et in Diaeta, tit. 9. in finem, citing that prima Corinth. 4. Elucidating which passage S. Doct. in Appendice Diaetae Dom. 4. Advent. says: The Law of the Emperor says, the lesser power ceases. Therefore the Apostle, considering the advent of the eternal judge, restrains it, saying: Judge not, etc. and in speculo animae, cap. 1. after he has said: suspicion is an evil opinion from slight causes, and this proceeds from the evil affection of envy; and then it has the notion of mortal, but otherwise it is not judged mortal; he adds: Judgment is perverse when one, ill affected toward another, not only suspects evil in him from slight causes, but also defines in heart or mouth, in the manner of a sentence, that mortal sin is committed by someone, and this of its genus is mortal, from whatever root it proceeds. Whence the Gloss on that, prima Cor. 4. Do not judge before the time says: We cannot avoid suspicions, because we are men; but judgment, that is, definitive sentences, we ought to guard against. But this judgment is always a sin too grave. This S. Bonav. says, and p. 3. Stimuli, cap. 8. he adds the reason why these judgments are forbidden to us, from the Apostle Rom. 14. Who art thou, that judgest another man's servant, and he repeats again: Do not judge before the time, until the Lord come, namely, because our neighbors are not subject to us in the forum of conscience, but to the Lord, and in the Sacrament, to His Ministers.

MOREOVER, if Judgment be right, it will be an act of Justice: But it will be right, if the due equality is established, both by a public Judge in the Tribunal of the Forum, and unto condemnation; and by anyone in the private judgment of conscience, namely, when in practice one judges according to that which is established to us, yet not unto condemnation, as S. Doct. warns opusc. de profectu Relig. cap. 1. Therefore what pertains to establishing the true pertains to prudence; but what pertains to establishing equality in order to the reputation of our neighbor, to which each one has the right of defending, will be an act of Justice, as Valentia declares loc. cit. But the Judgment which can be made privately by us concerning the inexcusable probity of our neighbor pertains to Prudence, not to Justice, because it does not pertain to us to speak the right concerning the crimes of all others. See also Tannerum disp. 4. quaest. 3. dub. 1.