Question III: Whether justice is a special virtue

JUSTICE, according to the abstract notion, inasmuch as it perfects in order to another, is twofold. So Aristotle 5. Eth. cap. 1. et 2. One is particular, which perfects man in order to another particular person, for instance a seller in order to a buyer. The other perfects man in order to another, not per se first, as the particular does, but in order to that other as he is a part of the community, and it is called Legal; for the Laws prescribe those things which pertain to the common good.

JUSTICE indeed particular is, without controversy, a special virtue, as D. Thom. says art. 7. D. Bonav. in 3. dist. 33. quaest. 2.

It is PROVED by D. Bonau. ad caput citatum Sapientiae, and in Diaeta salutis, tit. 5. cap. 8. from those words: For he teaches Sobriety, and Prudence, and Virtue, and Justice, as I explained quaest. 1. Then in that Commentary he brings forward Prov. 8. Mine is Equity, mine is Prudence, mine is Fortitude.

THEN it is proved by S. Doct. in Pharetra, lib. 2. cap. 42. from the Fathers related above.

It is PROVED thirdly by the arguments of D. Bonav. in 3. distinct. 33. quaest. 2. et dub. 1. and other places cited above.

The FIRST argument is taken from the potency which it perfects; for Prudence directs the rational, Temperance the concupiscible, Fortitude the irascible; but Justice all of them, to render what is equal. And in Diaeta, tit. 5. cap. 31. he brings forward on this point an elegant similitude. For just as God, in the Megacosm of the world, ordered all things in number, weight, and measure, as is said Sap. 11., so Justice in this Microcosm orders all things in number, weight, and measure, in commutations and distributions. Whence with a graceful figure he adorns it with the name of a GODDESS, to whom David said Psalm. 4. Sacrifice the sacrifice of justice, that is, perform just acts, as Valentia also expounds punct. 1. et ad cap. 1. Sap. on those words: Love justice, you who judge the earth, he says from D. Anselmo: Love justice, that you may be conformed to God, because the Lord is just, and has loved justices. Love (says S. Bonav.) justice uncreated, which is the rectitude of the divine will; and created, which is the rectitude of the human will. Thus he expounds that: Blessed are they who hunger and thirst for justice, with D. Ambrosio lib. 5. in Lucam, where he numbers Justice with the other Cardinals. So also D. August. lib. de moribus Ecclesiae, cap. 15. apud D. Bonau. in Centiloq. in the place cited.

The SECOND argument of S. Doct. is taken from the acts, by which different habits are recognized as different; for the act of Justice is, as I said quaest. 1., to render to each his right, or the equal and the due, in the ways expressed quaest. 2. But this does not belong to the other virtues.

The THIRD argument of S. Doct. is taken from the object; for acts are distinguished by it, as habits by acts. That is a special virtue which is concerned with an object peculiarly laudable and difficult, as is confessed among all: Such is particular Justice, since it is concerned with the equal due to another, about which the other virtues are not concerned: Therefore. Valentia also uses this argument puncto 2.

The FOURTH argument of S. Doct. is taken from the contrary. For, if anyone behaves unjustly toward another particular person, e. g. by snatching something from him, etc., he commits a special vice, for which he deserves special blame, even if he commits it from no other vice: Therefore to behave rightly and equally toward another is a special virtue. This is the argument of Aristotle 5. Eth. cap. 2. which Valentia loc. cit. follows.

The FIFTH argument of D. Bonav. is taken from the means of the virtues; for since these virtues consist in a mean, that virtue will be special which has a special mean: Such is Justice, which stands between too much, exceeding; and too little, detracting from the equal and the due. But the other moral virtues do not keep this mean, as all acknowledge.

As FOR legal Justice, it is certain that it is a general virtue, inasmuch as it is exercised in every matter of the moral virtues. For just as the Laws prescribe in every matter those things which conduce to the common good, as Aristotle teaches 5. Eth. cap. 1., so legal Justice perfects man, that he may behave rightly and justly toward the community in every matter of the moral virtues.

It is, however, CONTROVERTED: Whether Legal Justice is general not only in matter, but also in its formal notion.

BURIDANUS 5. Eth. quaest. 4. thinks that Legal Justice is any virtue whatever, as it operates for the common good; and thus Temperance, as it directs toward health on account of one's own advantage, is called temperance, but as it directs toward the common good of the Republic it is called Potency; inasmuch as it can serve the Republic by fighting, etc., it is Justice.

Yet the contrary opinion is that of S. Bonau. above, D. Thom. art. 6. whom Valentia follows punct. 2. Soto lib. 3. de Iustitia, quaest. 2. art. 5. and others commonly, apud Mastrium in 3. disp. 7. num. 189.

I ASSERT, with this opinion, that legal Justice is not a general virtue.

It is PROVED first from Aristotle 5. Eth. cap. 1. where he gives it special Encomia, by which a special virtue is confirmed; S. Doct. collected those elogia in Diaeta, titulo 5. cap. ultimo. Thus he proclaims it a perfect and most excellent virtue, and compares it to a star.

So also S. Doct. compares it to a straight way, which inclines neither to the right nor to the left, and applies to it that Psalm. 106. He led them forth into the right way, namely, that they might attain to the eternal prize.

THEN he compares it to the straight Rule, which is the measure of things: For as we measure all things by a rule, and divide all things equally, so also Justice. And as the Astronomical rule measures by the line of Fiduciae the altitude of the pole above the place of habitation, the Climate, etc., so also Justice measures the entire state of the land, of the city, that the due may be rendered to all.

THIRDLY he compares it to a straight Line. For as the straight line is the most beautiful of lines, as the Philosopher says, cited quaest. 1.: so also the rectitude of Justice makes man most beautiful in intention and conversation. As also the stature of the human body is most beautiful, because erect toward heaven. So the stature of the heart is most lovely, when through Justice it is raised up to God. Whence Cant. 7. Thy stature is like to a palm tree.

THEN he compares it to a Gem, set in gold. The four Cardinal virtues, he says, are gems in the golden Diadem. In the anterior part, or on the forehead, is Prudence, whose it is to see not only present things but also future ones. On the right is Temperance, because this makes man just in the right hand of prosperity; Fortitude on the left of adversity. But Justice in the posterior part, as the Bishop in procession, as the King at the end of the battle line, as the Pilot at the stern of the ship, as the just Sentence is pronounced at the end of the cause, and as at the end of the contest the triumphal Crown is given to the victor. Whence the Crown is named from it as from its principal part. So the Apostle prima Timot. 4. There is laid up for me a crown of justice. The Goldsmith, in whose Forge this precious crown is wrought, is Wisdom, of which Sap. 8. Then he compares it to the polar Star, and to God, as I showed above. Behold S. Doctor speaking most excellently.

It is PROVED secondly by the argument of D. Bonau. in almost all the places cited, because in the act of Legal Justice there is special praise and difficulty. Therefore. The consequence is proved from Aristotle 2. Eth. cap. 6. and 7. The antecedent is Aristotle 5. Eth. cap. 1. and 3. Politic. cap. 3.

Here the arguments first laid down can also be applied.

YOU OBJECT with Buridanus. All the Virtues operate according to rectitude, and in order to the public good; otherwise the virtues could be not right.

Valentia answers from D. Bonavent. in 3. dist. 33. quaest. 2. ad 2. et 4. that all the virtues indeed have their own proper rectitude and mediocrity, declining from the extremes; nevertheless each has its own singular rectitude, from which Justice makes the right according to all circumstances, inasmuch as it is ordered to another, and this belongs to Justice, not to the other virtues.