Question — Bontempi, Palladium Theologicum V · from Schola Thomistica

Question IV: Whether one doubting whether the thing commanded is lawful is bound to obey the prelate

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1.

The first opinion holds that he is not bound, nor can he obey. So Adrian, quodlib. 2. part. 2. Vasquez p. 3. disp. 65. cap. 9. Rodriguez p. p. cap. 9.

2.

The opposite opinion is that of Sanchez lib. 6. cap. 3. citing forty-three Doctors, especially D. Bonaventure 2. dist. 39. quaest. 3. ad ult. Add Basaeus V. Obed. num. 12. I defended it p. 2. tract. 1. disp. 27. quaest. 14. et 22.

3.

Diana part. 4. tract. 3. resol. 9. says the prior opinion approves itself to him in the case where the subject fears grave loss to himself or another from obedience. Aragon subscribes 2. 2. quaest. 69. art. 2. Medina prima 2. quaest. 19. art. 6. Henriquez lib. 14. cap. 3. in gloss. lit. X. Lessius lib. 2. cap. 4. dub. 9. num. 77. cont. Sanchez in select. disp. 43. num. 21.

4.

But if the Prelate himself doubts, the subject who knows it is not bound. So Castro Palao tract. 1: disp. 4. part. 14. Sanchez lib. 6. cap. 3. Salas 2. 2. quaest. 21. tract. 8. disp. unic. sect. 26. num. 275. Basaeus num. 13.

5.

I assert with the second opinion that in doubts the subject is bound to stand by the precept of the prelate. This opinion the Holy Doctor upholds also part. . . 1 speculi ad Novit. cap. 4.

6.

It is proved from the Holy Doctor first parte 1. de eccl. Hier. Et in confessionali, cap. 1. partic. 5. from Scripture, Deuter. 17. 2. Paral. 19. et Ezech. 34. where it is ordained that subjects in difficult and ambiguous matters stand by the judgment of the Priest Prelate.

7.

IT IS PROVED secondly from D. Bonaventure in 2. loco cit. et in speculo, by the reason on which all rely. In doubt the condition of the possessor is better, as is had in the rules of law; but in this case possession stands for the Prelate, to whom the subject promised obedience: Therefore. It is confirmed for the Minor. He is in possession, for which there is a presumption of law, against whom fails the burden of proving exemption: but in doubt the superior is presumed just, to whom the subject promised as to one acting in God's stead, cap. quid culpatur in fine 23. quaest. 1. et Basaeus teaches it is defined there, Covarruvias reg. Peccatum, p. p. num. 5. with others. So decreed Leo X. in Mirandula tract. 1. manual. quaest. 26. art. 9.

8.

IT IS CONFIRMED by the Holy Doctor part. 3. Eccl. Hier. multis scripturis Heb. ult. Eccles. 4. where the Holy Spirit exhorts us to entrust ourselves with simple obedience to the commands of Prelates: for they are established as sureties of souls, who are to render an account of them, which is a great consolation for subjects.

9.

YOU OBJECT with Vasquez, that for a right action a determinate practical judgment of conscience is required: but as long as you remain in doubt, you cannot judge that thing licit, nor do you adhere probabilistically, but you still act rashly in uncertainty, exposing yourself to the peril of fault. Nor is the superior in possession of jurisdiction, except by reason of the vow, which surely regards only licit goods. And just as I am not bound to fulfill a vow that I doubt I made, as the Doctors commonly hold with Diana tom. 1. tract. 3. resol. 10. so neither am I bound to the precept of a man. It is confirmed because whose is the precept not to expose even to the peril of mortal fault.

10.

THE HOLY DOCTOR ANSWERS, that a thing first doubtful in speculation, with the precept of the superadded superior — of whom it is well presumed that he aims at justice, prudence, etc. — acquires practical probability for execution, nor is it any longer practically doubtful, since possession stands for the authority of the one commanding, constituted by God to settle doubts. Wherefore I can and ought to determine the judgment, and thus I shall act probabilistically, not rashly. But it is not the same in a doubt of a vow, in which in my uncertainty I find no new something weighing down. But that things are thus is defined in cap. Quid culpatur in fine, 23. quaest. 1. where it is read: A just man, if perchance he even serve under a King, and a sacrilegious man, can rightly make war at his bidding, if what is commanded him either is certainly not against the precept of God, or it is not certain whether it is: so that perhaps the iniquity of commanding makes the King guilty: but the order of serving shows the soldier innocent. So explain Innocent, Hostiensis, John Andrew, Baldus, Abbas Navarrus, and Toletus.

11.

From which text is also defined the case in which soldiers doubt about the justice of the war. Of which I have treated enough in disp. cit. prima secundae. There however I declared that a subject, in doubt about the jurisdiction of the one commanding, is not bound to obey, because possession then stands for liberty. See the Doctors in Sanchez lib. 6. cap. 3.