Question III: Whether one who gives merely opinionative assent to an article of faith is a heretic

The SERAPHIC Doctor, loc. cit. in 3, whom Suarez follows disp. 19. sect. 4., and Cardinal Lugo disp. 17. sect. 5. n. 96., distinguish two ways of taking a probable opinion. First, as one that rests only on probable reasons. Second, as one that has joined to it a fear of the opposite. And indeed they declare that one who opines with fear is a heretic — Suarez and Lugo, following D. Bonaventure here; but in the former sense, by no means.

OTHERS, however, call one who opines about matters of faith a heretic absolutely. So Castro, Aragonius, and Azorius, as cited by Suarez, Coninck. disp. 18. dub. 7. num. 105., Castro Palao Tomo 1. tract. 4. disp. 3. p. 2. num. 12.

I ASSERT first, with D. Bonaventure, that one who opines with fear about matters of faith loses faith.

IT IS PROVED first from D. Bonaventure in corpore, et ad 3. et 4., by the reasoning which others employ: What denies the certitude of the object of faith removes it: Such is fearful opinion: Therefore.

I ASSERT second, that one who opines about matters of faith from probable reasons, without excluding a more certain assent from elsewhere, is not a heretic.

IT IS PROVED from D. Bonaventure, because Theology deals with matters of faith, and proceeds opinionatively with probable reasons, by which we are bound to be ready to render a reason to those who ask, as it is said in 1 Peter 3.

INDEED, if anyone were to say that the object, that God is, is probable, he would err, understanding that it ought not to be believed with certainty. And this alone do the arguments of Coninck show, as the Most Eminent Lugo observes.

I SEE that the dispute is more about the word than about the thing, and that it is sufficiently resolved by the distinction of the Seraphic Doctor.