Question — Bontempi, Palladium Theologicum V · from Schola Thomistica

Question II: Whether restitution is necessary for salvation

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1.

IT IS A COMMONPLACE, that saying of D. Augustine epist. 44: The sin is not forgiven unless what was taken away is restored. And cap. ult. de Iniustitiis: If damage has been given by your fault, you are bound in justice to make satisfaction. From which you have that to restore is a precept, as the Holy Doctor teaches in 4. dist. 15. quaest. ultima. But it is not necessary as a means, for we are often excused from restitution on account of incapacity, and yet we can still be saved, as I shall show from D. Augustine; but means, even when omitted without fault, impede salvation.

2.

THERE IS, however, a difficulty: Whether this precept is negative.

3.

OBSERVE, for distinguishing, that to recognize whether a Precept is affirmative or negative, one must attend to the matter which is commanded, not to the manner in which it is enunciated; for if the matter, or object, is something forbidden, it will be negative; but if something commanded, it will be positive.

4.

I ASSERT it is negative in substance, although in the form of words it is affirmative: Restore what is not thine, that is, do not retain what is another's: So the Doctors who seem contrary are reconciled, in Tanner disp. 4. quaest. 6. num. 8; Bassaeus num. 4.

5.

FOR IT IS PROVED that this grave precept is expressed positively by Matthew 22: Render therefore to Caesar the things that are Caesar's. And Romans 13: Render to all men their dues: tribute, to whom tribute; custom, to whom custom. Which the Holy Doctor pursues in Confessionali, cap. 4. partic. 2.

6.

IT IS PROVED, secondly, by the Holy Doctor loc. cit. and in Speculo, cap. 2, toward the end, with a splendid testimony of St. Augustine, epist. 54. ad Macedonium, which is cited in Regula Peccatum, de regulis Iuris, in 6, and in cap. cum tua, extra de usuris, and in Decretis 14. quaest. 6. can. 1. For when Macedonius had written in the letter, the preceding 53rd, which is to Augustine, that some even desired the penalty of their crime to be relaxed for them, while they possessed that for which the crime had been committed. St. Augustine answering says: You mention that worst kind of men, upon whom every medicine of penance is of no profit. For if the thing of another, on account of which the sin was committed, is not restored when it can be restored, penance is not done, but feigned: but if it is done truthfully, the sin will not be forgiven unless what was taken away is restored — but, as I said, when it can be restored. For often he who takes away loses, either by suffering evil men, or by living badly himself; and he has nothing else from which he may restore. To such a one, certainly, we cannot say: Restore what you took away, except when we believe him to have it, and he denies it. From this testimony of St. Augustine, D. Thom. loc. cit. and the Disciple collect, especially Tanner disp. 4. quaest. 6. num. 7, that restitution is not necessary by a necessity of means, because the condition is added: if he can.

7.

BUT THAT the Precept is negative is proved by Valencia with the argument of St. Bonaventure in the place cited, because it obliges forever not to retain the thing of another to the injury of its Owner, and the unjust detainer is always in unjust delay, sinning actually, as the Holy Doctor says in the place cited, and as I showed in the first part of the Summa.

8.

BASSAEUS ANSWERS that it does not oblige forever, e.g. in necessity. But then things are common; therefore he is not an unjust detainer, and so is not subject to restitution.

9.

YOU WILL OBJECT. If the debtor sins by not restoring, the creditor ought to give way, lest the debtor be damned; for the salvation of the soul is to be preferred to riches.

10.

ADRIANUS de restit., Sotus Lib. 4. de Iustitia, quaest. 6. art. 2, and Valencia disp. 5. quaest. 6. puncto 2, struggle with this. But I answer easily from D. Bonaventure in 3. dist. 29. quaest. ultima, that the Order of Charity between my goods and my neighbor's requires necessity in the neighbor — a necessity, surely, which is not found in him who can, and wills not, to restore. But I am not bound to give support to his evil will; for Charity does not act perversely.