Question VIII: Whether there is one prudence for all the moral virtues

WITH immense applause all Thomists admit one Prudence with D. Thomas quaest. 60. art. 1., where Caietanus, Medina, Conradus, Alvarez, Durandus 3. dist. 36., Buridanus 6. Eth. quaest. 13., Valentia prima secundae, disput. 85. cap. 2., Tanner. disput. 3. quaest. 1. dub. 2. num. 50. et alii. On the contrary, Scotus in 3. dist. 36. §. Quantum ergo ad istum, held that there are as many formal Prudences, specifically distinct, as there are acquired moral virtues about them, and consequently that to each moral virtue its own proper Prudence corresponds. The Nominalists follow, and all Scotists, in MASTRIUS disput. 7. quaest. 7. Arriaga disput. 34. sect. 3. Nominalists in Tannerus, Lessius Lib. I. cap. 2. disp. 2.

On the other hand, Scotus in 3. dist. 36. §. Quantum ergo ad istum, held that there are as many formal Prudences, and specifically distinct, as there are acquired moral virtues about them, and consequently that to each moral virtue its own proper Prudence responds. The Nominalists follow, and all the Scotists, in Mastrius disput. 7. quaest. 7. Arriaga disput. 34. sect. 3. the Nominalists in Tannerus, Lessius Lib. I. cap. 2. disp. 2.

THIS seems to me to be the Sentiment of D. Bonaventure Lib. V. compend. Theol. c. 14., where he also indicates the reason by which Scotus strives; it is this: as Art regards things makeable, so also Prudence things doable, indeed it expands further; for Art alone has the objects of artificial order; but Prudence ought to govern the other moral virtues, not only as to Ethics, that is, its own moral governance: Oeconomics of the family: Politics of the Republic: But since man has several ends, that is, the natural, as to human nature, and as to the world outside; and the divine, as to supernatural beatitude, and in order to all these he must give rules to the governance of the body in the deliberations of the mouth in speaking, and in human dealings and works, in all moral actions, in which so many various honesties, not subserving one another, must be taken up as a rule; it does not seem how a single rule of Prudence suffices, but surely as with respect to different things makeable by art different arts are given, as is evident; so different species of Prudences must be assigned. We see indeed that he who has the rules of the Architectonic art does not have the art of Goldsmiths; and he who has the Tailor's art, consequently does not have the Medical art; and he who has the smith's, straightway does not have the wool-working and weaving. Much more therefore must many Prudences be assigned to so many orders of things, so many different honesties, etc. so that means be assigned to each; for he who knows the mean of Temperance does not straightway have the mean of Justice, or of Fortitude, etc.

The Thomists REPLY that the reason of arts and of Prudence in doable things is diverse, because in these there is one mode of judging in finding the mean for the virtue, and one mode of taking counsel. So Caietanus ad 1. But if these things are firm, it will be necessary to reduce all arts into one; for all arts agree in the mode of taking counsel about their matters, and all moral virtues will be reduced into one, because all operate in the same way in seeking their mean; whence as there is one directing prudence, so one direct virtue, which nevertheless is false; for the mean in the matter of fortitude toward terrible things, or in the matter of Temperance toward foods, seek considerations far different on the part of the intellect from the mean required in humiliation, prayer, contracts, etc. Arriaga further declares this diversity, num. 28. For, that a man judge prudently whether, danger of life being imminent, it be licit to omit the Sacred [rite]; and that with the same danger imminent he may kill the Aggressor, quite diverse principles are required. It is confirmed by Rubione from D. Bonaventure, for prudence about the governance of others is a virtue specifically distinct from that which governs oneself, which is called Monastic Prudence. And again the prudence governing others is multiple, and is divided into Regnative, Political, Oeconomic, and Military, as Vasquez, Tannerus, and others concede from the opponents: Therefore the same will have to be said of prudence with respect to the virtues.

IT IS CONFIRMED; for a habit respecting several objects according to diverse formal reasons is not one, but several in species, as is had from Aristotle 3. de anima; But Prudence is such: Therefore. The minor is proved; for the objects to be directed are constitutive of the diverse virtues, and consequently they need directions of the intellect diverse in species.

I URGE, for Prudence regards no less the governance of the singular virtues under their diverse objects than the latter in it are borne toward and tend to the same rules. Nor indeed is it enough for Prudence to dictate the mean of the virtues in common, but it must show to each its proper means.

Nor should the Thomists say that this is done by one reason of good, otherwise there would be no reason why Prudence labors so much about the precise, individual, and various goodnesses, about which, sweating, it acquires species about that mean, for instance of Fortitude; and yet meanwhile species about the mean of Temperance are not at the same time acquired, as experiment shows, and as Scotus acutely argues, and this argument a posteriori, as Mastrius says, is most evident. Then Bassolis argues thus. Those habits are essentially distinct, one of which being acquired the other is not acquired; but so the matter stands, as I showed: Therefore.

Vasquez REPLIES that the habit first acquired about one virtue is afterwards extended, by way of superaddition, to a new act of another virtue.

AGAINST, because, as Arriaga argues, there is no reason for saying one of those abilities to be a habit, the other a mode, since each is disparate and independent, and hence diverse as to object.

The Thomists REPLY that all these are parts of the habit, yet united among themselves and constituting one habit.

AGAINST, because if the habits of Prudence are united, the habits of the moral virtues also could come together into one. Then, if they are diverse parts: Therefore there is not one habit, but many parts of Prudence, one for one virtue, another for another.

There is therefore ONE generic Prudence, and many species; just as there is one virtue of Temperance, and under it several species are enclosed. They OBJECT first from Aristotle 6. Eth. c. 13., where he says: For since Prudence, which is one, is present, all will be present at the same time, (that is, the virtues.) The reason is, because all have one mode of seeking the mean for the virtues.

They OBJECT first from Aristotle 6. Eth. c. 13., where he says: For since Prudence, which is one, is present, all will be present at the same time, (that is, the virtues.) The reason is, because all have one mode of seeking the mean for the virtues.

It is ANSWERED, that although Prudence labors about the mean, or about the moral good, nevertheless it does not act in the genus, seeking the end, or means, in generic goods, and of mediocrity; otherwise it would not direct sufficiently to the special objects, nor would the virtues be directed sufficiently; but as the singular virtues with diverse tendencies are borne toward their own peculiar objects, so many Prudences direct in those objects, nor have the Thomists known how to assign a diversity in this: Aristotle however speaks of Prudence in the genus, as it is extended to the directing of all the virtues.

They OBJECT secondly: The object of Prudence is the true; but the reason of the true is the same in any matter of moral virtue, which Prudence judges: Therefore the virtue of Prudence is one.

It is CONFIRMED: As there is one Medicine against all sicknesses, so one Prudence against all practical errors.

Mastrius REPLIES num. 150. that if the argument were valid, it would also prove that there are not several speculative sciences, because there is one truth of all. Therefore neither Science nor Prudence takes its species from truth, but from things; for these are the object under such a reason. To the proof he denies the parity; for Medicine is toward one health, but Prudence toward several spiritual healths.

BUT he does not advert to the force of the argument, nor does the arguer exercise himself well. The nerve of the argument therefore stands in this, that Prudence does not direct to practical truth as it is of temperance, or of justice, but as they ought to be fitted to the weight and measure of reason; as he who proves various balances by one weight, and thereby recognizes whether they are equal. So therefore Prudence weighs all moral acts of the virtues to its measure; even if it consider them materially; yet it weighs all the objects, even the formal ones of each virtue, to its rule.

It is ANSWERED therefore, that Prudence directs the singular acts of the virtues to the measure of reason, not precisely as to one common genus, but according to this or that special reason, seeking for each the individual means, clothed with so many circumstances, so that it does not stop at the being of reason, but equates the singular acts to the individual rules of that species of virtue; For it is the Directrix of human acts, which are singular, and it directs these to the special norm of the mean of this individual. For often those things which are right in species can be vitiated by some circumstance, and consequently be evil in the individual; and hence it needs special, singular, practical rules, since so various are the species of virtues, of which one is neither the species nor the circumstance of another, v. g. this act of attending to a sick man on a feast day, and on that account omitting the Sacred [rite], is not directed by prudence nakedly under this common reason, as it is rational, inasmuch as the act of Charity, performed in grave necessity, is deservedly to be preferred to positive human law; but as formally it is such an act, fortified with all the good circumstances of the individual; and hence as it is such an act perfectly, for such good causes; and consequently it is necessary that Prudence have all the rules, each and every one; and in this the example of Medicine is similar, which, although one in genus, nevertheless many in species are necessary, for instance purgative, preservative, and indeed toward several ends; whence there is not one health in genus, but several; for medicine does not consider health in the genus, but this and this health in number, which are various, and often opposed, by reason of the subject, because often what reduces one to temper would distemper another; for thus purgatives, which would too much weaken and enfeeble one, heal the robust man, burdened with many humors and full of superfluities; and what benefits one with burning fever will harm one with a Catarrh.

You will say. As Science stands in speculative matter: so Prudence in practical; but in speculative there is one science, considering principles and conclusions, although they are more distant among themselves than diverse practical principles: Therefore the diversity of doable things does not multiply prudences. Add that all are ordered to one end.

It is answered, that the habit of principles and of conclusions is not the same; for the habit of principles is called Intellect; the habit of conclusions is called Science, from the first Poster. and 6. Eth. To what he intimates about the end, I say, that the ends of Prudence are diverse, as the Saintly Doctor adverts in the cited place, and with him Scotus dist. 36. upon the letter I. for the end of Oeconomic Prudence is one, of Political another, etc. Another of Ethics; and as I said in the argument for the assertion, the ends are wholly diverse, and consequently there are several prudential habits, because it is not enough for prudence to direct to the end in the genus, but it must fit the thing in the individual, so that as it were the arrow may reach the Mark; and therefore several prudential habits are necessary, as Rada adverts controvers. 15. de Virtutibus, articulo 3.

You will object lastly. Prudence, to govern one virtue, must govern according to the norm of general rectitude, embracing all the rules of rectitude, otherwise from one defect that action will be perverse: Therefore there is one prudence, extended to all things.

It is answered, that intensive perfection in its own moral species is enough for each virtue, nor ought it to be extended to all the rules of rectitude of others, which indeed would be applied impertinently. For what does the rule of fasting subserve to the rule of buying? But although Prudence be a rule counseling, directing, and imperating (yet prescribing as it sounds forth by dictating; for the intellect does not command,) and to these many rules of rectitude are necessary; nevertheless not all and each are to be applied for the singular acts of the virtues.

From what has been said other objections of Tannerus and others collapse, which I shall indicate here.

The first, because there is one mode of judging about all particular doable things, namely by consultation finding the mean in any matter of the virtues, and the conveniency of the means to the end of the same virtue.

The second, because the mean and honesty of one virtue cannot be prescribed except with respect to the others.

The third, because the diversity of doable things, in order to the habit of the intellect, is only material.

It is answered indeed by denying the assumptions, and indeed that of the first proposition; for the mode which subserves one particular doable thing does nothing for the direction of another doable thing; but this one mode of judging about all is generic, and consequently insufficient, since the special is required. Similarly, although in each virtue there is a conveniency of the mean to its end; nevertheless this conveniency is one in the virtue of temperance, another in the military virtue, nor does the Plowman hold the goad with the same conformity of the mean by which the Sailor holds the rudder; say the same of the rest.

To the second objection I say similarly, that one virtue has its whole honesty intensive, without the honesty of another; as proved above; even if extensively it cannot be occupied in the matter of other virtues unless aided by their auxiliary supplies; yet this, since it is per accidens, and sometimes superfluous, since it is not always necessary for some virtue to go forth beyond its limits, is beside the point.

To the third it is plain, because although several or few doable things put on the reason of material object; yet since each doable thing falls under the direction of one particular virtue; in order to this, it is necessary that it obtain the reason of formal object; and since moreover such a virtue undertakes the burden of discerning, directing, and impelling in its matter, it needs a particular prudence, which can fulfill that office; which, since it is the object of this Prudence, and indeed distinct from the object of the Prudence of another, as clearly appears from what has been said; it follows that this and that Prudence are of diverse reason, and consequently differ among themselves.