Question V: How error or ignorance concerning a vow causes involuntariness

I SUPPOSE what I wrote in prima secundae, Tract. 1. disput. 3. quaest. 12., on how ignorance causes the involuntary, and in disp. 4. quaest. 1., which circumstances cause the Involuntary.

AND indeed, that ignorance of the substance of a thing, or of those circumstances which notably alter the matter of a vow, makes it involuntary, Sanchez l. 4. Decal. cap. 2. num. 11. teaches, Soto l. 7. de Iustitia, quaest. 1. art. 2., Aragon. 2. 2. quaest. 88. art. 1. fol. 966., Lopez p. 1. Instruct. cap. 56., Manuele 2. Tomo summae, cap. 92. Soto brings an example: If someone, deceived about the choice of foods in a certain religion, were to vow it; he would by no means vow it if he knew. Similarly concerning a journey to Jerusalem, if he believed it to be only ten leagues; but not if he erred about some minute accidents: for knowledge of all the accidents of a vow is not necessary for it, as I said in quaestio prima.

The GREATER difficulty is: when the change to be made in the matter of a vow is unknown, or not foreseen, whether, after such a change is made, one is released from the vow.

COMMONLY the adage is circulated: No one is bound by a vow, an oath, or any other promise, to that to which he would not have wished to bind himself, had he adverted to it while he promised. So teach Innocentius c. veniens, in the single number, de iure iurando, there Abbas num. 4., Anton. cap. Quemadmodum, num. 13., of the same title, Hostiens. summa, of the same tit. num. 3., D. Antonin. 2. p. tit. 10. cap. 6. §. 5., Angel. verb. iuramentum, 4., Sylvester v. Votum 2. quaest. 17., and v. Iuram. 3. quaest. 1. part. 9., and verb. Iuramentum 4. quaest. 6., and quaest. 13., Tabiena v. Iurare, quaest. 15. num. 16., Armilla v. Iuramentum, num. 35., Nauar. summa, cap. 18., Hispana num. 5., Latina num. 7., Molina T. 2. de Iust. disp. 272. col. 2.

From this arises another rule: That releases from the obligation of a vow or oath which, if it had happened or been known from the beginning, would have impeded their being made. So D. Thom. in 4. dist. 38. quaest. 1. art. 3. quaestiuncula 1. ad 1., Maior there, quaest. 1., Carthus. quaest. 2. §. Quaeritur item., Archidiac. c. Qui bona, quaest. 17. num. 4., Sylvest. verb. Votum, quaest. 1., and verbo Iuramentum 3. quaest. 1., and v. Pactum, quaest. 4., Tabiena quaest. 2. num. 3., Armilla num. 2., Medina C. de Ieiun. quaest. ult. ad 4., Angles flor. 2. p. quaest. unica de voto, art. 2. difficult. 3. concl. 5., Enriquez l. 11. de matrimonio, cap. 14., whom Sanchez refers to, loc. cit. num. 18. and 25.

OTHERS, on the contrary, say a vow is rendered invalid only if the substance of the vow is changed; otherwise we would never have anything stable in contracts; for many things happen which, had they been foreseen, the contract would not have followed. So Caiet. 2. 2. quaest. 88. art. 3., Soto l. 7. de Iustitia, quaest. 2. art. 1. ad tertium, Armilla verb. votum, num. 11., where the same Caietanus from perult., Nauar. summa, cap. 12. num. 39., Lopez p. 1. instruct. cap. 43., Valentia 2. 2. disp. 6. quaest. 6. p. 4., Sanchez loc. cit. num. 21., Fagundez in 1. praecepto Decal. l. 2. cap. 13. num. 32.

It must be NOTED, with D. Bonav. in 3. dist. 39. art. 3. quaest. 3. in corpore, that changes of things change obligations, even those ratified by oath. For these compel while things remain in the same state, as is found in c. Quemadmodum de iure iurando, and other texts; and D. Bonav., whom Guttier. follows, de iuramento, p. 1. cap. 29. num. 6. and cap. 71. num. 6., Sanchez loc. cit. num. 20. For who does not see that a vow which brings detriment to salvation does not bind for that time, as if someone had vowed not to accept a prelacy, because he was then unfit, that afterward, having been made necessary for aiding Religion or the state, he is no longer bound? Otherwise he would sin by neglecting the public necessity. Therefore this vow, or oath, if made absolutely, would be evil, as D. Bonav. notes in the cited place.

INDEED, however, if you should open a wider entrance for annulling vows and oaths from any change of things whatever, a way would already be opened to six hundred confusions. Therefore only a grave change suffices, and in this the authors of the first opinion judged rightly.

Take NOTE, however, that that difficulty, or supervening change, which I said ought to be grave, ought also to be new, such that the substance of the thing promised did not carry it with it. So Gloss. in c. non est vero authoritate, Hostiens. summa, tit. de iureiur., and Sanchez num. 29.

ANOTHER difficulty is: whether a vow or oath is invalid when there is error concerning the cause of the vow. A similar question is, when the cause was true at the time of the vow, and afterward ceased.

The cause is TWOFOLD: one final, and that is that to which the operation is directed and ordered, without which he would not operate: the other is the moving, or impelling cause, which stirs a mind already resolved to pursue the work more easily, or more willingly.

I ASSERT first, the final cause ceasing, the obligation of the vow ceases. Thus is understood c. Cum cessante causa, de appell., and similar texts, in which it is brought forward: the cause ceasing, the effect ceases. See Sanchez num. 42., Bassaeus num. 12., who excepts solemn vows, because in them one is presumed to will that state, known to all.

I ASSERT secondly, the impelling cause ceasing, dispensation is made easier, although it does not annul the vow. Thus it is gathered ex c. magna de voto, at the end, and the Gloss there, with the word, ut venires teaches it, Anton. num. 15., Abb. num. 14., Tiraquel. Tract. cessante causa, limitatione 1. num. 10.

You OBJECT against the first, from cap. magna: the Bishop of Troyes is dispensed from a vow he had made of pilgrimage to Jerusalem, so that by the aid of a certain Count, whom he had heard was staying there, he might obtain the liberty of his Church. Now indeed the Bishop was admonished that the Count had died, and so he seemed free from the pilgrimage, and yet, consulting the Pontiff, he obtained a commutation of the vow: therefore, the end ceasing, the vow does not cease.

It is ANSWERED by Abb., Tiraquel., Angel., and Sylvest., that this was only an impelling cause, not a final one.

CONTRA, because the Pontiff testifies: To induce us especially to make this indulgence for you, that since you had chiefly issued a vow of pilgrimage for the liberty of the Church of Troyes, to be obtained through the said Count, with him removed from the midst, because the cause ceasing, the effect could also more easily cease. Where it is brought forward that the principal cause of the vow was to visit that Count for the sake of the liberty of the Church. The Gloss there thinks this, Hostiens. num. 21., Anton. num. 15., Anchar. num. 15.

Sanchez ANSWERS, num. 43. loc. cit., that that commutation of the vow was not necessary, but granted out of greater caution, which the Pope signifies, saying: The cause of that vow ceasing, its obligation could also be ended. As if he said: it ceased, if it was a final cause; otherwise if it was impelling.

Nor does it stand in the way that this commutation is called an indulgence, and so ought to accomplish something; yet it would accomplish nothing if the vow had already ceased of itself.

For he answers that privileges are granted for this work, that consciences may be pacified.

Yet FOR ME an easier solution occurs: that that end of going to the Count was not the adequate one, but at the same time a concasue with another end of going to the sacred places; for the Pontiff says the vow was chiefly issued to that end of visiting the Count, where the Pontiff in the particle chiefly includes implicitly another concasue, not indeed dead, for going more willingly, but simply for going. Therefore the commutation was necessary, because the adequate end had not ceased.

NOR does Sanchez speak well in saying it was not necessary; for the Pontiff professes to dispense, and no scruple is found in that Bishop, but only the cessation of the principal end, whereby the effect of the obligation could more easily cease by taking away the remaining obligation, which had resulted from the other end. But this is clearer than light in that privilege, where elsewhere he asserts that he was bound, bringing in Ps. 75. for it: Vow, and pay to the Lord. And the Pontiff also fears scandal from the laity in so easily freeing clerics from obligations. The Pontiff adds that he compassionates his aging age, the necessity of the Church of Troyes, etc., and commutes the expenses of the journey into so many alms for the holy places without diminution. Therefore he was truly still bound, since he also intended a pilgrimage to the holy land of the east, and on that account had taken up the cross, as Pope Alexander III says there. Nor does Sanchez prove well that that commutation was not necessary, because the Pontiff had said it could cease, that is, it had ceased, if it was a final cause; otherwise if impelling; for this does not show that the dispensation was not necessary.

From what has been said, it is asserted thirdly, that error concerning the adequate final cause takes away the vow, not error concerning the merely moving one. It is clear from what has been said: for if the vow ceases with it ceasing, therefore it is not made with it not existing; for as a thing is ordered to being conserved, so also to being; for by the same causes a moral thing is made and conserved.

But when it is doubtful whether it is a final cause, favor must be given to liberty, which is possessed, as I said in quaest. 2., against Bass. n. 12., Azor. l. 11. cap. 15., Vasq. p 2. disp. 70., Sanchez l. 2. de matr. disp. 9., Sylvium quaest. 88. art. 1.